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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
Johnson v. Johnson4 5 and Roshto v. Roshto,46 the supreme court
once more47 expressed its disapproval of the practice of dividing
custody between separated or divorced parents, emphasizing the
need for continuous control by a single parent; but at the same
time the court specifically affirmed the natural right of the par-
ent not awarded custody to visit the child at reasonable times.
Sampognaro v. Sampognaro48 involved only an application of
Article 157 of the Civil Code consistent with the supreme court's
practice of presuming that, after separation or divorce, it is to
the greater advantage of the children to place them in the cus-
tody of the mother.
PARTNERSHIP. AGENCY.
Robert A. Pascal*
Partnership
The proper interpretation of a provision in a partnership
agreement relative to the distribution of "capital and effects" on
the death of a partner was one of the problems in Succession of
Conway.' The widow of a deceased partner contended the agree-
ment contemplated a distribution of the value of the partnership's
business good will as well as other assets. The surviving partners
denied this contention. Whether the agreement in question, an-
alysed as a whole, did or did not contemplate the inclusion of
good will among the "capital and effects" or "assets and effects"
of the partnership is a question of fact which need not be con-
sidered here and which should not be considered without a re-
view of the record. The supreme court, however, agreed with the
widow's interpretation on the theory that good will was as much
"partnership property" as capital assets, citing out-of-state au-
thorities to this effect. Civil Code Articles 2808 and 2809 recognize
good will as an asset, even one which may be the contribution of
a partner to the total assets of the partnership.
Agency
The only agency case which need be mentioned is Morgan
v. Cedar Grove Ice Company, Incorporated.2 According to this
45. 214 La. 912, 39 So. (2d) 340 (1949).
46. 214 La. 922, 39 So. (2d) 344 (1949).
47. See Pierce v. Pierce, 213 La. 475, 35 So. (2d) 22 (1948), and the writer's
remarks thereon (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 201.
48. 41 So. (2d) 456 (La. 1949).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 41 So. (2d) 729 (La. 1949).
2. 41 So. (2d) 521 (La. 1949).
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decision, the president and general manager of an ice manufac-
turing corporation, authorized to contract for the sale of its pro-
duct, may bind the corporation by a stipulation for liquidated
damages in the event of the corporation's non-performance of its
obligations under the contract. Third persons are entitled to rely
on a corporation's general officer having authority to enter into
contracts in the usual course of business and certainly stipula-
tions for liquidated damages must be frequent in contracts for
the delivery of ice. The same result would follow under ordi-
nary agency law, Article 3000 of the Civil Code providing that
the authority of agents may be inferred from their functions or
the ordinary course of the business to which they are devoted.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
Despite the criticism that has been levelled at the doctrine
of lesion beyond moiety the court demonstrated in Jones v. First
National Bank, Ruston,1 that the opportunity it affords for pro-
tecting a vendor of real property who transfers his title thereto
for less than one-half its actual value is not to be lightly surrend-
ered. The case did not involve an ordinary sale of the property
but a dation en paiement in satisfaction of a judgment. The posi-
tion of the transferee was that, under the provisions of Louisi-
ana Civil Code Articles 1861 and 1863, a dation en paiement of
immovable property is not subject to the doctrine of lesion beyond
moiety, and that in any event the value of the land for oil, gas
and mineral purposes cannot be considered in arriving at the
true value of the property. In rejecting the latter contention the
court was able to clear up certain misconceptions stemming from
the case of Wilkins v. Nelson2 and resulting in a holding by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Silbernagel v. Harrell3 that the
court declared unsound. The opinion pointed out the obvious dif-
ference between the sale of a mineral right, a contract speculative
by its very nature and covering an immovable by disposition of
law to which the code does not extend the protection of the
action of lesion, and the sale of property the value of which is
enhanced by the possibility of profitable mineral development.
In finding a transfer of real property in the form of a dation
en paiement to be subject to the action, the court merely pointed
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 41 So.(2d) 811 (La. 1949).
2. 155 La. 807, 99 So. 607 (1924).
3. 18 La. App. 536, 138 So. 713 (1932).
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